Slate Magazine: A World Adrift

Why there is no global leadership on climate change, trade policy, energy, and too many other issues. ...

So runs the by-line on Nouriel Roubini's concise analysis of the G-20 and world affairs in general, published today in Slate magazine. (Nouriel Roubini is chairman of Roubini Global Economics and Professor of Economics at New York University's Stern School of Business.) Some tasters from the beginning and the conclusion:

We live in a world where, in theory, global economic and political governance is in the hands of the G-20. In practice, however, there is no global leadership. And there is severe disarray and disagreement among G-20 members about monetary and fiscal policy, exchange rates and global imbalances, climate change, trade, financial stability, the international monetary system, and energy, food, and global security. Indeed, the major powers now see these issues as zero-sum games rather than positive-sum games. Ours is, in essence, a G-Zero world.  ....

.... for the first time since the end of World War II, there is no nation—or strong alliance of nations—with the political will and economic leverage to secure its goals on the global stage. As in previous historical periods, this vacuum may favor the ambitious and the aggressive as they seek their own advantage. In such a world, the absence of a high-level agreement on creating a new collective-security system—focused on economics rather than military power—is not merely irresponsible, but dangerous. A G-Zero world without leadership and multilateral cooperation is an unstable equilibrium for global economic prosperity and security.

It's definitely worth reading the whole piece. Do it. Now.

G20 summit agrees to reform IMF

BBC Online brings news of a slight re-balancing within world economic governance—towards emerging economies—at the G20 Summit currently being held in South Korea: [link]

Finance ministers from the G20 leading economies have agreed reforms of the International Monetary Fund, giving major developing nations more of a say.

At a meeting in South Korea, they agreed a shift of about 6% of the votes in the IMF towards some of the fast-growing developing countries.

Those nations will also have more seats on the IMF's Board, while Western Europe will lose two seats. But the US will retain the veto it has over key decisions.

Such decisions require an 85% vote - Washington holds 17% under the IMF's weighted voting system.

The Guardian has more [link]:

Fast-growing emerging economies will get more clout at the International Monetary Fund under a landmark agreement clinched on Saturday that reflects a shift in global power from industrial countries.

Under the deal, more than 6 percent of voting shares at the Fund will shift to dynamic developing countries such as China, which will become the third-biggest member of the 187-strong Washington-based lender. Europe will give up two of the eight or nine seats it controls at any given time on the IMF's Executive Board, which will continue to have 24 members, according to a statement issued after a meeting of finance ministers from the Group of 20 leading economies.

As part of a wide-ranging package, the G20 also agreed to double the IMF's quotas, which determine how much each country contributes to the IMF and how much it may borrow from it. The quotas currently total about $340 billion. The IMF staff had argued for a doubling, which it said would put the fund "in a strong position to forestall or cope with potential crises in the coming years".

The G20 said the reforms would make the Washington-based lender "more effective, credible and legitimate". The governance reforms amount to an overhaul of the global economic order established when the Fund was set up after World War Two, prompting IMF Managing Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn to describe the agreement as historic. "This makes for the biggest reform ever in the governance of the institution," he told reporters.

The reduction in Europe's representation is less than the United States was seeking. However, Washington, which has a 17.67 percent share of IMF quotas will retain its veto on the Fund's most important decisions. These will continue to require a super-majority vote of 85 percent, according to IMF officials.

Without doubt, today's news represents an important update on World Governance (Unit 3) - should a question on the International Monetary Fund come up in the exams, this development would form a valuable current example!

Joseph S. Nye: The Future of Power

Joseph S. Nye,former US Assistant Secretary of Defense, Harvard University professor and author of The Future of Power, provides an up-to-date perspective on the "future of power" in our increasingly multipolar world:

Global government is unlikely in the twenty-first century, but various degrees of global governance already exist. The world has hundreds of treaties, institutions, and regimes for governing interstate behavior involving telecommunications, civil aviation, ocean dumping, trade, and even the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

But such institutions are rarely self-sufficient. They still require the leadership of great powers. And it remains to be seen whether this century’s great powers will live up to this role.

As the power of China and India increases, how will their behavior change? Ironically, for those who foresee a tri-polar world of the US, China, and India at mid-century, all three of these states – the world’s most populous – are among the most protective of their sovereignty.

Some argue that our current global institutions are sufficiently open and adaptable for China to find it in its own interests to become what Robert Zoellick, president of the World Bank, once called a “responsible stakeholder.” Others believe that China will wish to impose its own mark and create its own international institutional system as its power increases.

The countries of the European Union have been more willing to experiment with limiting state sovereignty, and they may push for more institutional innovation. But it is unlikely that, barring a disaster like World War II, the world will witness “a constitutional moment” such as it experienced with the creation of the United Nations system of institutions after 1945.

Today, as a universal institution, the UN plays a crucial role in legitimization, crisis diplomacy, peacekeeping, and humanitarian missions, but its very size has proven to be a disadvantage for many other functions. As the 2009 UN climate-change summit in Copenhagen demonstrated, meetings of 192 states are often unwieldy and subject to bloc politics and tactical moves by largely extraneous players that otherwise lack the resources to solve functional problems. As US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton put it recently, “the UN remains the single most important global institution…but we are constantly reminded of its limitations….The UN was never intended to tackle every challenge; nor should it.”

Indeed, the main dilemma that the international community faces is how to include everyone and still be able to act. The answer is likely to lie in what Europeans have dubbed “variable geometry.” There will be many multilateralisms and “mini-lateralisms,” which will vary by issue with the distribution of power resources.

For example, on monetary affairs, the Bretton Woods conference created the International Monetary Fund in 1944, and it has since expanded to include 186 countries. But the dollar’s global pre-eminence was the crucial feature of monetary cooperation until the 1970’s. After the weakening of the dollar and President Richard M. Nixon’s decision to end its convertibility into gold, in 1975 France convened leaders of five countries in the library of the Chateau de Rambouillet to discuss monetary affairs. The group soon grew to seven, and later broadened in scope and membership – including Russia and a vast bureaucratic and press apparatus – to become the G-8.

Subsequently, the G-8 began the practice of inviting five guests from the emerging economies. In the financial crisis of 2008, this framework evolved into the G-20, which boasts a more inclusive membership.

At the same time, the G-7 continued to meet on a narrower monetary agenda; new institutions, such as the Financial Stability Board, were created, while bilateral discussions between the US and China played an increasingly important role. As one experienced diplomat put it, “if you’re trying to negotiate an exchange-rate deal with 20 countries or a bailout of Mexico, as in the early Clinton days, with 20 countries, that’s not easy. If you get above 10, it just makes it too darn hard to get things done.”

He’s right, of course. After all, with three countries, there are three bilateral relationships; with ten, there are 45; and with 100 players, there are nearly 5,000. That is why, on issues like climate change, the UN will continue to play a role, but more intensive negotiations are likely to occur in smaller groups such as the Major Economies Forum, where fewer than a dozen countries account for 80% of greenhouse gas emissions.

Much of the work of global governance will rely on formal and informal networks. Network organizations (such as the G-20) are used for setting agendas, building consensus, coordinating policy, exchanging knowledge, and establishing norms. As Anne-Marie Slaughter, Director of Policy Planning in the US State Department, argues, “the power that flows from this type of connectivity is not the power to impose outcomes. Networks are not directed and controlled as much as they are managed and orchestrated. Multiple players are integrated into a whole that is greater than the sum of its parts.”

In other words, the network provides power to achieve preferred outcomes with other players rather than over them.

To cope with the transnational challenges that characterize a global information age, the international community will have to continue to develop a series of complementary networks and institutions that supplement the global framework of the UN. But if major countries are divided, it is unlikely that even network organizations like the G-20 can set the agenda for the UN and the Bretton Woods financial institutions to act upon.

In the immediate aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, the G-20 seemed to help governments to coordinate their actions and avoid rampant protectionism. The world waits anxiously to see how it will perform when it meets again in Seoul this November.